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Unbarring the Bar of Justice: Standing in
Environmental Suits and the Constitution
PHILIP WEINBERG*
Introduction
Environmental protection in the United States has in large
measure been achieved through the courts. The signal victories as
early as the 1960s were judicial-most tellingly, the halting of the
power project that would have defaced Storm King Mountain in
New York's Hudson Highlands1 and the Interstate highway that
would have destroyed the integrity of Memphis's Overton Park.2
These decisions were of first magnitude in themselves as well as
for the precedents they established for future suits. They directly
led to the numerous actions brought by concerned citizens and en-
vironmental advocacy organizations to review adverse govern-
mental decisions and enjoin harmful activities. Without such
recourse in the courts there would be scant leverage to overturn
government actions, no matter how damaging to the environment
they might be.
Unlike most other litigation, the issue of the plaintiffs' stand-
ing to bring the suit is often a major one in environmental suits
brought by private parties-as is also the case in suits involving
civil liberties and constitutional issues.3 Since standing in the
federal courts is inextricably linked to the Constitution's provision
that federal courts have jurisdiction over "cases" and "controver-
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; J.D., Columbia Law
School 1958; Chair (1988-89), Environmental Law Section, New York State Bar Asso-
ciation; author of Practice Commentary to New York Environmental Conservation
Law (McKinney 1997 and Annual Supps.), and a casebook, Environmental Law: Cases
and Materials (3d ed. 2001), as well as co-author of Environmental Impact Review in
New York (2000), Environmental Law and Regulation in New York (1996), and Under-
standing Environmental Law (1998). The author is indebted to Sophie Lambrou (St.
John's University School of Law, 2004) for research assistance in preparing this
article.
1. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
2. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
3. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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sies,"4 those courts often treat it as a constitutional issue. This
article will examine standing in that context.
Part I will trace the origins and evolution of the constitutional
standing requirement. Part II will describe the expansion of
standing in the federal courts in the 1960s and 1970s, both
through judicial decisions and legislation providing for citizen
suits in the major federal environmental statutes. Part III will
discuss the assault on standing in the past decade or so, commenc-
ing with Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,5 and its contain-
ment in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services.6
Parts IV and V will briefly contrast standing in the federal courts
with state law and some decisions from other countries aug-
menting standing in environmental suits. I will contend that
while the fundamental standing requirement is surely legitimate,
some recent Supreme Court and state court decisions have unrea-
sonably and improperly attempted to shut the courthouse doors to
litigants with genuine environmental claims. Future decisions
should cabin those rulings and ensure a forum for those seeking to
enjoin unlawful government action that injures the environment
and public health.
I. The Evolution of the Constitutional Standing
Requirement
After several decades of litigation over the scope of standing,
it is tempting to believe the standing issue has always been with
us. That temptation should be resisted.
The English common-law courts were historically open to liti-
gants without regard to their actual injury or threat of injury.
Under Articulo Cleri, noted by Coke as a provision authorizing
suits to restrain the ecclesiastical courts from exceeding their ex-
isting jurisdiction (largely limited to issues of family law and re-
ligious concerns), such suits could be brought "by the parties
themselves, or by any stranger."7 The courts in Colonial America
routinely furnished advisory opinions to legislative assemblies.8
That practice continues today in the Supreme Judicial Court of
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
6. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
7. Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Re-
quirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 819 (1969).
8. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709, 1723
(1998) ("In the beginning, there was advice.").
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Massachusetts and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. 9 And
clearly, "English practice at the time the Constitution was framed
included resolution of some abstract disputes."10
The Constitution's framers discussed the role of the newly
fledged federal courts at length. Since the new government was to
be one with separation of powers, unlike the English system
where Parliament ruled supreme, the federal courts, in James
Madison's view, had to be "limited to cases of Judiciary Nature.""
And of course Article III empowers those courts to decide "cases"
and "controversies"-language the Supreme Court has seized on
in our own time to rule that limits on standing are constitutionally
mandated. 12 But what does the "case or controversy" wording of
Article III actually mean?
There seems to be little or no evidence of the Framers' concern
that standing to sue be cabined. Charles Pinckney recommended
that the Supreme Court issue advisory opinions to the President
and Congress in line with the Massachusetts practice, and the
Constitutional Convention never expressly rejected this sugges-
tion. 13 The Framers repeatedly sought a robust role for the fed-
eral courts in preventing "legislative despotism" and "tyranny" by
Congress.' 4 James Iredell of North Carolina, soon to be a Su-
preme Court justice, described a statute "not warranted by the
Constitution [as] barefaced usurpation."' 5 If there was any clear
pronouncement that the terms "case" and "controversy" were orig-
inally intended to impose constitutional restrictions on standing
to sue, it seems to have eluded not only historians but also the
fervent advocates of limiting standing.
9. See Op. of the Justices to the Sen. & House of Reps., 126 Mass. 557, 561 (1878)
(Massachusetts "evidently had in view the usage of the English Constitution. .. ").
For modern examples, see Answer of the Justices to the Senate, 780 N.E.2d 444
(2002) and Opinion of the Justices (Tax Plan Referendum), 725 A.2d 1082 (1999).
10. Lee Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy"Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REV. 297, 300 (1979) (citing Berger, supra note
7).
11. 2 RECORDS OF FED. CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed. 1923)
[hereinafter "Farrand"].
12. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (explaining, "Article III of
the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual 'cases' and 'contro-
versies."'); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974)
(stating that to give a standing to a plaintiff who has no concrete injury would lead to
possible abuse of the judicial process and disturb the separation of powers between
the branches of government).
13. Katyal, supra note 8, at 1723 (citing Farrand, supra note 11, at 341).
14. Berger, supra note 7, at 832 (quoting James Wilson).
15. Id. at 833.
2003]
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Shortly after the Constitution's adoption, Congress enacted
the Invalid Pension Act, 16 an aptly named law providing disabled
Revolutionary War veterans with pensions. 17 Eligibility was to be
decided by the United States circuit courts, the trial courts of the
day, on which Supreme Court justices then sat.'8 However, the
Secretary of War had power to overrule them.19 Several federal
judges advised President Washington that the statute violated the
separation of powers, without awaiting specific cases. 20 As one
commentator put it, "the Justices declined to act as pension ad-
ministrators .... ,"21 When the issue reached the Supreme Court in
Hayburn's Case,22 that Court again informed the President the
Act was unlawful. 23 Congress amended the statute to cure its de-
fect, so the Court never ruled on its disability.24
It was to be many decades before the federal courts would
concern themselves with the standing of litigants. When they did,
it was, ironically, the defenders of Progressive Era social and eco-
nomic legislation who first played the standing card to defeat suits
challenging those statutes.
Massachusetts v. Mellon 25 was the first case in which the Su-
preme Court dismissed a suit for want of standing, in 1923.26 The
Court held a taxpayer could not challenge a federal statute since
her "interest in the moneys of the Treasury . . .is shared with
millions of others; [and] is comparatively minute and indetermin-
able .... ,,27 It distinguished suits by municipal taxpayers, tradi-
tionally allowed, on the ground that their "interest is direct and
immediate. ' 28 Relevant to our concerns, it went on to note that
"[w]e have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress
on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may
16. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243, repealed in part and amended by Act




20. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792).
21. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judi-
cial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1869 (2001); see also Katyal, supra note 8, at
1731-34.
22. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
23. Id. at 410-11.
24. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243, repealed in part and amended by Act
of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324.
25. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 487.
28. Id. at 486.
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be considered only when the justification for some direct injury
suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to
rest upon such an act."29
Five years later, in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Associa-
tion,30 the Court dismissed a suit for a declaratory judgment re-
garding the terms of a lease, ruling no "case or controversy"
existed. 31 But the Court noted that the plaintiff lessee had stand-
ing;32 that was not the problem. This decision antedated the De-
claratory Judgment Act,33 enacted in 1934 in response to this and
similar rulings. 34
The Court had earlier, in Muskrat v. United States,35 likewise
dismissed a suit for want of controversy. Muskrat challenged one
of the egregious allotment acts dividing the previously tribal prop-
erty of American Indians into minute individual shares or "allot-
ments."36 The Act provided for suit in the Court of Claims to
"determine [its] validity."37 After discussing Hayburn's Case and
other early instances of Congressional attempts to place the fed-
eral courts in situations violative of separation of powers, the
Court held no case or controversy existed here since there was,
essentially, no party adverse to the plaintiffs, who objected to the
reduction of their allotment by the legislation.38 The Court cited
an 1892 decision dismissing a suit on similar grounds, noting that
"[it was never thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as
to the constitutionality of the legislative act."39 In more recent
times, the Supreme Court has consistently expressed concern that
standing genuinely exist, along with other jurisdictional require-
ments, in order to eschew rendering advisory opinions and collu-
sive suits. 40
29. Id. at 488.
30. 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 289.
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2000).
34. See generally Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
35. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
36. Id. at 348.
37. Id. at 350.
38. Id. at 361-62.
39. Id. at 359-60 (citing Chicago & G.T.R.R. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
(1892)).
40. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. L.A. Mun. Ct., 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
2003]
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II. The Expansion of Standing in the Federal Courts
The 1960s and 1970s saw citizen standing expanded in the
federal courts, both in environmental and constitutional litigation.
The harbinger of increased citizen standing was Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission,4 1 in which
the Second Circuit roundly rebuffed challenges to the standing of
litigants seeking court review of the license issued to construct a
pumped-storage hydroelectric plant atop Storm King Mountain in
the Hudson Highlands. The court held the petitioners, conserva-
tion groups, their members, and neighboring towns, were "ag-
grieved" parties under the Federal Power Act,42 and had standing
to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision. 43
As it noted,
In order to insure that the ... Commission will ... protect the
public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
aspects of power development, those who by their activities and
conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be
held to be included in the class of "aggrieved" parties under [the
Act].44
Citing Supreme Court decisions involving the Establishment
Clause, the court ruled economic injury was not a prerequisite for
standing.45 As for Article III, it noted that "[allthough a 'case' or
'controversy' which is otherwise lacking cannot be created by stat-
ute, a statute may create new interests or rights and thus give
standing to one who would otherwise be barred by the lack of a
'case' or 'controversy"'-a clear invitation to Congress to enact the
citizen-standing provisions soon to be placed in the Clean Air Act,
Clean Water Act, and other environmental statutes.46
Shortly after Scenic Hudson, the Supreme Court ruled in
Flast v. Cohen47 that a federal taxpayer had standing to question
funds spent by Congress allegedly in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause, limiting the denial of standing to federal taxpayers
41. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 825(b) (2000).
43. 354 F.2d at 616.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 615 (citing School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)).
46. Id. at 615. These provisions are discussed infra text accompanying notes 58-
72.
47. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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in Mellon.48 Flast, however, was itself limited in Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State,49 a five to four decision rejecting the standing of citi-
zens and taxpayers to challenge the conveyance of Government
property (a closed veterans' hospital) to a sectarian school.50 The
majority ruled taxpayer standing inappropriate since the com-
plaint was that the Government was giving away property, not
appropriating tax funds.51 On that theory, conveying Yellowstone
Park or the White House to a religious institution would presuma-
bly be beyond challenge.
While opening the courthouse doors partially to taxpayers,
the Supreme Court continued to restrict citizen standing to judi-
cial review of governmental decisions within the "zone of interest"
of a particular statute who could demonstrate actual, or
threatened, "injury in fact." The decisions are not easy to recon-
cile. The Court found that tenants seeking an integrated environ-
ment had standing to challenge racial discrimination in housing,52
but later denied standing to black parents of public school pupils
who contended unlawful tax exemptions for white-only private
schools would worsen public-school segregation. 53 It rejected the
standing of persons claiming that exclusionary zoning prevented
them from buying homes in a suburb where they sought to live,
relying on the lack of a "case or controversy" under Article III,54
but soon thereafter found standing on similar facts where one
plaintiff alleged he worked in the town and would move there if
affordable housing existed. 55
The Supreme Court has shown less tolerance for granting
standing to those challenging more general governmental actions.
It denied standing to citizens claiming the Central Intelligence
Agency had failed to make its budget publicly available under a
constitutional provision mandating "a regular Statement and Ac-
count of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money. '56
48. Id. at 103.
49. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
50. Id. at 476-90.
51. Id. at 486.
52. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
54. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
55. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264
(1977). Warth also rebuffed the standing of a builder of affordable homes on the
ground that its application to rezone was not currently pending. 422 U.S. at 505-06.
56. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 168 (1974); see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 7.
2003]
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Similarly, where members of Congress held commissions in the
military reserves allegedly in violation of the Constitution's ban
on legislators "holding any office under the United States,"'5 7 the
Court concluded that the plaintiff citizens lacked standing to chal-
lenge the asserted conflict.58 To the Court, this was "injury in the
abstract," since the plaintiffs' interest was "'undifferentiated' from
that of all other citizens." 59 Finding a lack of a case or controversy
under Article III, the Court dismissed the suit.60 In doing so, the
Court overturned the district court's finding of standing based on
the rationale that if the plaintiffs could not seek review, "then as a
practical matter no one can."61 The Court dryly observed that
"[t]he assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no
one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing."62
In the environmental arena, litigants, encouraged by the ex-
pansive standing sustained in Scenic Hudson and similar deci-
sions, brought numerous suits challenging a variety of
governmental actions. 63 In this dawn of broad public awareness
of environmental concerns, before wide enforcement of regulatory
statutes, these suits tended to be, like Scenic Hudson and Overton
Park,64 actions to enjoin highways, power plants, and other
projects viewed as environmentally harmful. In Sierra Club v.
Morton,65 the Sierra Club, doubtless viewing itself as the Nation's
premier conservation advocate, attempted to push the envelope by
arguing that it needed no specific assertions of injury to obtain
standing to challenge a federal agency's actions.6 6 In Sierra Club,
the Supreme Court emphatically rebuffed that claim, holding
quite sensibly that "broadening the categories of injury that may
be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from aban-
doning the requirement that the party seeking review must him-
self have suffered an injury."67 Therefore the Sierra Club was not
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
58. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974).
59. Id. at 217.
60. Id. at 226-27.
61. Id. at 227.
62. Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974)).
63. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Hardin, 428
F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
64. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
65. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
66. Id. at 732-33.
67. Id. at 738.
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"aggrieved" as required by the Administrative Procedure Act 6s8 for
review of a federal agency's final determination.
Was the Sierra Club deliberately trying to obtain a perma-
nent pass as to standing as a self-styled "representative of the
public"?69 The gambit did not succeed. It was here that Justice
Douglas, in his long-standing role as the Court's environmental
knight-errant, argued in dissent that such suits ought "to be liti-
gated in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled,"
urging "the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to
sue for their own preservation." 70
The Douglas approach would have rapidly led to a reductio ad
absurdum. Who is to decide who ought to actually represent a
mountain, forest, or river? Its owner is generally the very govern-
mental or private entity whose acts assertedly threaten the re-
source. The nearby residents often favor developing the area for
economic reasons, and in any event, they have no greater rights to
publicly owned property than the rest of us.
The Court in Sierra Club v. Morton made clear that asser-
tions of individualized injury to the plaintiff organization or its
members would suffice, and a year later, in United States v. Stu-
dents Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures ("SCRAP"),71
reached the apex of citizen standing. The Court ruled that a
group of students could seek to judicially review freight rates,
then subject to federal government approval through the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, which favored newly minted metal
over recycled scrap. 72 SCRAP's claim to standing were that its
members encountered discarded metal beer cans and the like
while hiking, which, it argued, was dumped in the woods because
of the disparity in shipping charges. 73 Justice Stewart, author of
Sierra Club v. Morton, wrote for the Court in SCRAP that this
sufficed to confer standing.74 (The court went on to reject the
claim on the merits, reversing the lower court.)75
68. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
69. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727, 736 (quoting Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v.
Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1970)).
70. Id. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Christopher Stone, Should Trees
Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450
(1972)).
71. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
72. Id. at 689-90.
73. Id. at 685.
74. Id. at 689-90.
75. Id. at 698-99.
2003]
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While this augmentation of standing to embrace non-eco-
nomic injury was occurring in the federal courts, Congress was
enacting the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)76 as well
as the first comprehensive environmental regulatory statutes, the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. 77 NEPA, which requires fed-
eral agencies to weigh the environmental impacts of and alterna-
tives to actions they perform, fund, or license, contains no express
provision for judicial review. However, the courts have from the
start heard challenges to non-compliance with NEPA and have
consistently held that environmental injury conferred standing.78
In contrast, economic injury alone, though a traditional basis for
standing,79 does not provide standing in NEPA litigation, oddly
enough.80 (This anomaly was doubtless a factor in the New York
courts adopting the same view as to standing to challenge non-
compliance with New York's State Environmental Quality Review
Act (SEQRA) in the much-debated Society of Plastics Indus., Inc.
v. County of Suffolk decision,"' discussed in Part IV of this article.)
The Clean Air Act was the first federal environmental regula-
tory statute to contain a citizen-suit provision, in its § 304. De-
signed to finesse the standing disputes that had delayed or
hamstrung plaintiffs in environmental litigation, this statute pro-
vides that "any person may commence a civil action" in federal
district court to enjoin violations of emission standards or limita-
tions, as well as enforcement orders and certain types of permit
violations.8 2 Plaintiffs must give sixty days' notice to the EPA, the
state and the alleged violator.8 3 Commencement and "diligent[]
prosecut[ion]" of an enforcement action bars a citizen suit.8 4 Al-
though the statute speaks of enforcement actions in court as a bar
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
78. Comm. for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980); Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. v. Skinner, 767 F.
Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1991).
79. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
80. Nev. Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir.
1993); Cent. S.D. Coop. Grazing Dist. v. Sec'y of United States Dep't of Agric., 266
F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2001). But see Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that injury to broadcaster through interference from power transmission
lines, though economic, resulted from environmental impacts and provided standing
under NEPA).
81. 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1991), discussed infra text accompanying notes 187-95.
82. 42 U.S.C § 7604(a) (2000).
83. Id. § 7604(b)(1)(A).
84. Id. § 7604(b)(1)(B).
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to citizen suits, the courts have sensibly ruled that an administra-
tive enforcement action similarly bars citizen suits if the relief
sought by the government agency is substantially similar to that
which could be sought in a citizen suit. 5 In addition to injunctive
relief in citizen suits, civil penalties are also available, payable to
the United States, not the citizen plaintiff.8 6 An important inno-
vation enables parties to recover reasonable attorneys' and expert
witnesses' fees, 7 a mechanism to help furnish a level playing field
when citizens or advocacy groups challenge corporate and govern-
mental defendants with greater resources.
The citizen suit provision has in fact widened access to the
courts in air-quality cases. The courts have generously construed
it. In one notable and enlightened decision, Friends of the Earth v.
Carey,88 the court sustained a citizen suit and enjoined violations
of a State Implementation Plan adopted by New York pursuant to
the Clean Air Act, noting that "[i]n enacting [the citizen-suit pro-
vision], Congress made clear that citizen groups are not to be
treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as welcomed
participants in the vindication of environmental interests ...
Thus the Act seeks to encourage citizen participation rather than
treat it as a curiosity or a theoretical remedy." 9 Quoting an ear-
lier case, the court noted: "Fearing that administrative enforce-
ment might falter or stall, 'the citizen suits provision reflected a
deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the courts,
as a supplemental and effective assurance that the Act would be
implemented and enforced."' 90
The federal courts have consistently viewed § 304 as a broad
grant of jurisdiction obviating battles over the directness of the
injury inflicted. But they nonetheless recognized the limits im-
posed by Article III, and found § 304 did not confer standing on
plaintiffs that failed to assert any cognizable injury, such as pro-
industry advocacy groups, or business competitors, seeking to as-
sert environmental injury.9 1 This pattern continued with the en-
85. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 961 (1979).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a), (g) (2000).
87. Id. § 7604(d).
88. 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976).
89. Id. at 172.
90. Id. at 172 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700
(D.C. Cir. 1975)).
91. Pac. Legal Found. v. Gorsuch, 690 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1982); Kaiser Cement
Corp. v. San Diego Air Pollution Control Dist., 19 ERC 2100 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
20031
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actment of citizen suit provisions in the Clean Water Act,92
Endangered Species Act,93 Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act,94 and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA),95 the last two of which have
proved to be a foundation for numerous suits to compel cleanup of
hazardous waste sites (though often brought by plaintiffs with ec-
onomic injury who would likely have standing in any event). 96
III. The Assault on Standing
In a series of decisions in the 1990s, the Supreme Court first
cabined, then actively sought to truncate, standing in environ-
mental litigation. The majority in this campaign, led by Justice
Scalia, was not at all inhibited by the congressional enhancement
of standing in the citizen-suit enactments discussed.
Justice Scalia fired the opening salvo in Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation.97 The suit was brought to challenge actions
of the Secretary of the Interior taken under the Federal Land Pol-
icy and Management Act (FLPMVA), 98 which authorizes the De-
partment of the Interior to review withdrawals of government-
owned land from mining and similar commercial uses. 99 The Na-
tional Wildlife Federation (NWF), a respected conservation group,
and several of its members, contended the cancellation of some of
these withdrawals was done in violation of the FLPMA by failing
to adopt land-use plans, and without the environmental impact
review contemplated by NEPA.100
The Court ruled the plaintiffs were not "aggrieved" as re-
quired by the Administrative Procedure Act. 101 Although they
were within the zone of interests of the FLPMA, which the Court
agreed the Act was written to protect, the affidavits of the two
members of the NWF submitted to show standing were, it ruled,
too broad to satisfy the requirement of particular injury.10 2 The
92. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); see § 1365.
93. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); see § 1540(g).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000); see § 6972.
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000); see § 9659.
96. See, e.g., United States Dep't. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); Lutz v.
Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
97. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
98. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000).
99. Id.
100. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 875.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 883.
102. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 886-87.
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affidavits referred to areas of millions of acres, of which only a few
thousand were being removed from the Act's protection. ' 0 3 As the
district court had concluded, "[t] here is no showing that [the plain-
tiffs] recreational use and enjoyment extends to the particular
4,500 acres covered by the decision to terminate classification to
the remainder of the two million acres affected by the
termination." 0 4
Though the plaintiff relied on SCRAP to show its standing,
the Court airily rejected that decision as one "whose expansive ex-
pression of what would suffice for ... review under its particular
facts has never since been emulated by this Court... "1o05 It is not
easy to understand why these affidavits did not suffice to show the
plaintiff was aggrieved. Why should it matter that they depicted
larger tracts of federal land than those that were stripped of pro-
tection? This truly exalts form over substance.
The Court likewise rebuffed the supplemental affidavits chal-
lenging the agency's reevaluation of formerly protected lands. It
held the "so-called 'land withdrawal review program"' was not an
identifiable agency action at all, but rather a series of separate
actions to declassify parcels.' 0 6 And, it concluded, one "cannot
seek wholesale improvement of this program by court decree,
rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of Con-
gress, where programmatic improvements are normally made. ' 0o
This adumbrated the majority's real concern-one more explicitly
voiced in later decisions-that the courts ought not, under separa-
tion-of-powers principles, set aside programs set in motion by
Congress and the Executive-as if courts had not overturned such
programs innumerable times when they found them unconstitu-
tional or otherwise unlawful.'0 8
Justice Blackmun wrote for the four dissenters. He main-
tained that the affidavits "averred that [the affiants'] 'recreational
use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands .. .have been and
103. Id. at 887-88.
104. Id. at 887 (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D.D.C.
1998)).
105. Id. at 889.
106. Id. at 890.
107. Id. at 891. The majority, also perhaps more defensibly, found these affidavits
had been submitted so late in the game that they were correctly not considered by the
district court. Id. at 897-98.
108. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (segregation in D.C. schools);
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continue to be adversely affected in fact by the unlawful actions of
the . . . Department."' 10 9 As he sensibly noted, "[tihe areas
harmed or threatened by mining and associated activities may ex-
tend well beyond the precise location where mining occurs."1 0
The dissent went on to point out that the majority's denial that a
"program" to declassify federal lands exists is not only inaccu-
rate-"[e]veryone associated with this lawsuit recognizes that the
[Department], over the past decade, has attempted to develop and
implement a comprehensive scheme for the termination of classifi-
cations and withdrawals"' "-but also irrelevant since it "bears on
the scope of the relief ultimately to be awarded. . . rather than on
the jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain the suit. ...
Just two years later, the Court, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 113 took an even greater swipe at standing, this time undeter-
red by a citizen-suit statute. The suit challenged a Department of
the Interior regulation limiting to United States territory the ap-
plicability of the Endangered Species Act provision requiring fed-
eral agencies to consult with the Department to "insure that any
action authorized, funded or carried out by such agency.., is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction.., of [its
critical] habitat .... ,,114 The plaintiff conservation group and its
members contended the new rule, which replaced a rule applying
the statute to federally-funded or performed actions worldwide,
contradicted the statute, which contained no geographic limits,
and the lower court had so held. 115
Justice Scalia again wrote for the Court. He noted that Arti-
cle III standing requires injury in fact, traceable to the defen-
dant's actions, and likely ("as opposed to merely 'speculative"') to
be redressable by the court.1 16 He went on to emphasize that
these "are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indis-
pensable part of the plaintiffs case," and must be supported with
evidence. 11 7 And here, the Court concluded, the plaintiff failed to
109. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 902-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 904 n.5.
111. Id. at 914-15.
112. Id.
113. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
114. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). The regulation is at 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (2002).
115. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987), rev'd, 851
F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
116. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
117. Id. at 561.
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show "injury in fact."118 Affidavits by two members of Defenders
asserted that they were wildlife biologists interested profession-
ally in endangered or threatened species-the Nile crocodile, the
Asian elephant and leopard-whose critical habitat was at risk
through United States funded construction projects: a dam in
Egypt and a development project in Sri Lanka. 1 9 The members
alleged that they had visited those sites and intended to return to
study those species, but were concerned lest their habitat be dam-
aged before then. 20 But, the Court found, "'some day' intentions
[to return] do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent'
injury that our cases require."' 2 ' In short, a plaintiff must "show
that he will soon expose himself to the injury."122 It went on to
reject the plaintiffs' further claim that as zoologists they had suffi-
cient interest in these species' habitat to confer standing, coolly
observing that
Under these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian elephants in
the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of Asian elephants in
the Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue because the Director of the
Agency for International Development (AID) did not consult
with the Secretary regarding the AID-funded project in Sri
Lanka. This is beyond all reason.12 3
Nor, in the eyes of Justice Scalia, was there redressability. 124
(However, this portion of the opinion was a plurality only, not con-
curred in by Justices Kennedy and Souter.) 25 The plaintiff ar-
gued AID was required to consult with the Secretary of the
Interior before acting, but the suit was against the Secretary, not
AID. 126 This seems hypertechnical. Surely an injunction rein-
stating the extraterritorial reach of the Act would require the
agencies to obey the law, and AID could surely be added as a de-
fendant if that became an issue. Further, AID participated in this
litigation and could hardly ignore its outcome. The majority par-
ried this point by insisting that "standing is to be determined as of
118. Id. at 568.
119. Id. at 563.
120. Id. at 563
121. Id. at 564.
122. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 566.
124. Id. at 568.
125. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 568-69.
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the commencement of suit,"127 a truism, but one that does not
meet the argument that AID became a party and therefore sub-
jected itself to redress.
What of the Act's citizen suit provision, explicitly authorizing
"any person" to "commence a civil suit ... to enjoin any person,
including the United States and any other governmental instru-
mentality or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision" of the Act? 128 Justice Scalia thought it "remarkable"
that the Court of Appeals had found this established a basis for
this suit, since it finessed in his eyes the plaintiffs "inability to
allege any discrete injury flowing from the failure" of the AID to
consult with Interior as the Act requires. 129 But to authorize suits
such as this was the very purpose of the citizen suit provision, as
its plain meaning and legislative history both show.
How the Court steered clear of Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Ameri-
can Cetacean Society,130 a 1986 ruling in which whale-watching
groups were found to have standing to challenge a governmental
inaction allegedly in violation of a treaty, is noteworthy. The ma-
jority here blithely noted that the "whale watching and studying
of their members w[ould] be adversely affected by continued whale
harvesting," claims virtually identical to those asserted in Defend-
ers.13 ' But, adhering to its view that the plaintiffs had failed to
assert injury, the majority improperly analogized their suit to the
generalized grievances rejected in earlier taxpayer and citizen
cases where no citizen-suit statute provided standing. 32
Tellingly, the majority concluded that to permit this suit to
proceed "would enable the courts, with the permission of Con-
gress, 'to assume a position of authority over the governmental
acts of another and co-equal department"' and "permit Congress
to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's
most important constitutional duty, to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed....
127. Id. at 571 n.5.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000).
129. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572.
130. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
131. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8 (quoting Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at
230-31 n.4).
132. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
133. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 489 (1923)).
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Justice Stevens concurred only because he found the Act did
not apply overseas. He believed the plaintiffs had standing since
they "visited the critical habitat of an endangered species [and
had] a professional interest in preserving the species and its
habitat, and intend[ed] to revisit them in the future.... Jus-
tice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented. They main-
tained the majority likely "will resurrect a code-pleading
formalism," offering examples of future suits that might be re-
jected under the Court's narrow view of standing.'3 5
Defenders was clearly designed to impose barriers to standing
despite the plain intent of Congress in enacting citizen-suit legis-
lation. The assault appeared likely to succeed. 136 In fact, the
Court's next significant decision on standing in environmental
suits extended Defenders somewhat, relying heavily on the redres-
sability argument that had failed to convince a majority in
Defenders.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment137 also involved
a citizen suit, this time, in contrast to Defenders, against a com-
pany that had concededly and blatantly violated environmental
laws designed to safeguard public health. 138 The defendant had
for eight successive years failed to submit reports of its storage
and release of hazardous chemicals as required by the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).' 39 Once it
received the required 60-day notice of impending citizen suit, how-
ever, the company hastily filed the required reports. 140 Again
leading the charge, Justice Scalia concluded this belated compli-
ance went beyond rendering the action moot, and actually de-
prived the plaintiff of standing to commence the suit.' 4 '
The Court first ruled that whether the district court had juris-
diction is an issue to be decided initially, before turning to the
merits, viewing this as mandated by the case or controversy re-
134. Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 593 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. See Stanley E. Rice, Standing on Shaky Ground: The Supreme Court Curbs
Standing for Environmental Plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 38 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 199 (1993); Brandon D. Smith, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: A Slash-and-
Burn Expedition Through the Law of Environmental Standing, 28 U.S.F.L. REv. 859
(1994).
137. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
138. Id. at 87-88.
139. Id. at 87-88; 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000).
140. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 87-88.
141. Id. at 110-11.
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quirement of Article 111.142 Emphasizing that standing entails in-
jury, causation, and redressability, the Court concluded that
redressability was lacking here. 143 The plaintiff sought judgment
declaring the defendant in violation of the law, an injunction man-
dating compliance, and the civil penalty provided for by the Act. 144
The Court rejected each of these. It found a declaratory judgment
that the defendant violated EPCRA "worthless" since the defen-
dant had filed the reports, and there was no dispute over whether
it had to do So.145 And of course courts will not issue injunctions to
mandate acts that have already occurred.
But what of the civil penalties for the defendant's eight years
of violations? The Court concluded they "might be viewed as a
sort of compensation or redress to [the plaintiff] if they were paya-
ble to [the plaintiff]. But they are not."1 46 Since "[t]hese penalties
.*. are payable to the United States Treasury," the plaintiff "seeks
not remediation of its own injury ... but vindication of the rule of
law-the 'undifferentiated public interest' in faithful execution of
EPCRA.' 47 And "[rielief that does not remedy the injury suffered
cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very es-
sence of the redressability requirement."' 48
Concurring, Justice Stevens, largely joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg, limited his agreement to the view that "EPCRA...
does not confer jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past viola-
tions," and would thus "leave the constitutional question for an-
other day."1 49 This, in his view, cut the Gordian knot, since the
Court had earlier ruled that the Clean Water Act's citizen-suit
statute did not support actions "for wholly past violations."'5 0
Rebuffing the majority's undue reliance on the asserted want
of redressability, Justice Stevens observed that "'[r]edressability,'
of course, does not appear anywhere in the text of the Constitu-
tion. Instead, it is a judicial creation of the past 25 years-a judi-
cial interpretation of the 'Case' requirement of Article III."'151
142. Id. at 102-03.
143. Id. at 105.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c).
145. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 106.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 577).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 112 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 114 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987)).
151. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 124 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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One might have thought an apostle of plain meaning and orig-
inal intent like Justice Scalia might have hesitated to rely so
heavily on such a recently sculpted doctrine without textual basis.
Further, previous decisions based on lack of redressability were
suits asserting some indirect injury, as in Defenders, and suits
against government agencies, triggering the separation of powers
concerns voiced in Defenders and again by the majority, inappro-
priately, in this case.
In any event, as the concurrence notes, why is payment to the
United States not redress? "History supports the proposition that
punishment or deterrence can redress an injury."152 And state
and local governments can enforce EPCRA, even though the pen-
alties flow to the United States. 153 Does this holding, Justice Ste-
vens rightly asks, undermine their standing too?154 The entire
majority opinion rests on a narrow, grudging, indeed hostile, read-
ing of Congress's citizen-suit provisions. As for the separation of
powers concerns that undergird the majority's ruling, Justice Ste-
vens aptly notes that "[ilt is this Court's decision, not anything
that Congress or the Executive has done, that encroaches on the
domain of other branches of the Federal Government."1 55
Ironically, the Court, shortly before Steel Co., had actually
read a citizen-suit statute expansively to allow a suit by plaintiffs
asserting economic rather than environmental injury, in Bennett
v. Spear.156 Not only was the statute the same one involved in
Defenders (though the injury alleged was far more specific), but
the author was once again Justice Scalia. Whether this was a
genuine retreat from Defenders and National Wildlife Federation,
or a manifestation of greater concern for business interests alleg-
ing economic harm from government, depends on one's degree of
skepticism. Certainly economic injury is a traditional basis for
standing. On the other hand, as noted earlier,15 7 the courts have
required environmental harm, and rejected economic injury, in
NEPA litigation.
Just two years after Steel Co., a decision widely viewed as the
bombardment prior to the final assault on citizen standing, the
152. Id. at 127 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)( 2 ).
154. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 129 (Stevens, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 130 (Stevens, J., concurring).
156. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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Court swung decisively to the opposite direction. 158 The Laidlaw
decision firmly supported standing under a citizen-suit provision,
retreating from the earlier line of cases, and rebuffed claims of
lack of standing as well as mootness. 159
Laidlaw was a suit for an injunction and civil penalties under
the Clean Water Act against a waste-water treatment plant oper-
ator, asserting it was discharging pollutants in violation of its per-
mit into a South Carolina river. 160 The plaintiff environmental
organizations submitted affidavits from members claiming the de-
fendant's discharges interfered with their use and enjoyment of
the waterway for fishing, swimming, and the like. 16 1 The district
court found these claims asserted injury in fact.162 More than two
years after suit was brought, Laidlaw came into compliance with
its permit, as it had agreed to do in settling a suit brought by the
State. 6 3 (Significantly, Laidlaw had asked the State to sue it in a
vain attempt to derail the impending citizen suit on the ground
that a State action had been brought against it.164 The ploy failed
when the district court ruled the State's suit had not been "dili-
gently prosecuted" so as to be a defense to a citizen suit under the
Clean Water Act.)' 6 5
The district court awarded a civil penalty, but denied an in-
junction since Laidlaw's violations had ceased.16 6 The Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed, ruling the case moot since "the only remedy
currently available to [the plaintiffs] -civil penalties payable to
the government-would not redress any injury [they had]
suffered."1 6 7
The Supreme Court reversed that ruling, finding the case not
moot since "voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not
deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the
practice."'168 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, criticized the
Fourth Circuit's reliance on Steel Co. to find mootness, and noted
158. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
159. 528 U.S. 167.
160. Id. at 175-76.
161. Id. at 181-83.
162. Id. at 183.
163. Id. at 177-78.
164. Id. at 177-78.
165. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 176-78 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2000)).
166. Id. at 178.
167. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 149 F.3d 303, 306-07 (4th
Cir. 1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
168. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189 (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455
U.S. 283, 289 (1982)).
[Vol. 21
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol21/iss1/3
UNBARRING THE BAR OF JUSTICE
that "the Court of Appeals confused mootness with standing"-
Steel Co. had ruled the plaintiffs lacked standing since the defen-
dant there had complied before suit commenced. 169
Turning to the plaintiffs' standing, the Court found it existed
on the strength, as noted, of their members' loss of recreational
use of the waterway. 170 It found this perfectly consistent with the
earlier decisions restricting standing, each of which acknowledged
that standing exists where plaintiffs allege, "recreational values of
the area will be lessened."171
Erasing some of the graffiti of Steel Co., the Court expressly
held the plaintiffs showed redressability in seeking civil penalties,
even though the funds are payable to the government. 17 2 Con-
gress itself found civil penalties "deter future violations," a "deter-
mination [that] warrants judicial attention and respect."173 It was
"likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the penalties would
redress [the plaintiffs'] injuries by abating current violations and
preventing future ones .... ,174
Predictably, Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justice
Thomas. He urged that citizen-suit plaintiffs must assert harm to
the environment, not just to themselves, and these plaintiffs had
not done so.175 This, of course, would subvert the entire premise
of the standing requirement, consistently insisted on by Justice
Scalia himself, that plaintiffs show particularized, individual
harm.1 76 He went on to conclude that there was in any event no
redressability, relying on the dubious motion advanced in Steel
Co. that a penalty paid to the government furnished no benefit to
a private-citizen plaintiff.1 77 This, as noted earlier, totally ignores
the deterrent value of the penalty, as well as the very purpose of
citizen suits to compel compliance with environmental laws.
The Court's welcome bolstering of citizen standing in Laidlaw
soon bore fruit. In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Re-
cycling Corp.,178 the same Fourth Circuit that had derailed the
Laidlaw suit sustained a similar Clean Water Act citizen action.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 181-82.
171. Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
172. Id. at 185-86.
173. Id. at 185.
174. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 187.
175. Id. at 198-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
177. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 202.
178. 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
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The district court had dismissed the suit for lack of standing, de-
spite assertions of injury quite similar to those in Laidlaw, and
the Fourth Circuit had affirmed. 179 Following Laidlaw, though,
the Fourth Circuit, en banc, reversed and found standing.' s0 It
specifically rejected the district court's insistence that the plain-
tiffs assert, and show, increased pollution of the waterway caused
by the defendant's discharges as a prerequisite to standing, noting
that amounted to "creating evidentiary barriers to standing that
the Constitution does not require and Congress has not em-
braced."18 ' And, the court noted, "threatened injury.., is by itself
injury in fact."' 8 2 There was no need at the standing stage of a
suit for "laboratory analysis of the chemical content, salinity, or
ecosystem of Shealy's lake"; that "would necessitate the litigation
of complicated issues of scientific fact that are entirely collateral
to the question Congress wished resolved-namely, whether a de-
fendant has exceeded its permit limits." 1 3 Standing under a citi-
zen-suit statute does not, in short, mandate a pre-trial trial to
show the very violations the plaintiff must later prove.
Though the assault on standing in environmental suits has
been rebuffed, the battle is not over. Bills have been proposed
(though not yet introduced) to restrict standing in NEPA litiga-
tion.18 4 The current climate in Congress and the Administration
clearly calls for vigilance against such attempts.
IV. New York's Standing Restrictions
New York's courts have created peculiar, and unjustifiable,
restrictions on standing in environmental litigation that its legis-
lature never envisaged. While a few states have enacted citizen-
suit statutes like those adopted by Congress, 8 5 New York has not;
rather, it requires a particularized injury, as do the federal courts
under Sierra Club v. Morton.'8 6 However, a 1991 Court of Ap-
peals decision, Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. County of
179. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d 107 (4th
Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
180. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 151.
181. Id. at 156.
182. Id. at 160.
183. Id. at 162.
184. Carl Pope, Forward into the Past: Bush Pushes for the Return of Secret Gov-
ernment, SIERRA, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 88.
185. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 324.1701 (1999); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214,
§ 7(A) (West 1989).
186. See Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 324 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1974).
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Suffolk, s7 narrowed standing in New York to an unwarranted ex-
tent. This 4-to-3 ruling concerned a challenge to a county law re-
stricting the use of certain plastic containers.188 The plaintiffs, a
plastic industry association and one of its members, claimed the
law had been adopted in violation of the State Environmental
Quality Review Act (SEQRA),18 9 the state statute modeled on
NEPA. 190 The court ruled both parties lacked standing since their
asserted injuries were not "different from that of the public at
large."1 91 The industry association failed because its constituents
were "entities whose economic interests are not served by bans on
plastic products[,]" so that the environmental concerns it raised-
increased contamination of groundwater from greater bulk in
landfills if paper replaced plastic, increased truck traffic and the
like-were not "germane to the purposes of this nationwide trade
organization.' 92 And the local plastics manufacturer too was
found to lack standing since the harms it claimed were "tenuous"
and "ephemeral. " 193 This decision contrasts starkly with the Su-
preme Court's recognition that economic injury alone suffices for
standing in environmental cases. 194
Dissenting, Judge Hancock, joined by Judges Simons and
Titone, aptly noted that the decision effectively barred challenging
environmental injury suffered by all area residents, unless the
plaintiff can somehow show injury unique to itself. This, he as-
serted, "establishes criteria so restrictive as to present a virtual
bar to SEQRA challenges ... having such area-wide environmen-
tal effects." 95
Sure enough, Society of Plastics led to overly restrictive rul-
ings denying standing to SEQRA plaintiffs alleging genuine harm
unless they could show that harm to somehow be unique. In Ot-
sego 2000, Inc. v. Planning Board, 96 a local conservation group
was denied standing to contest town approval of a large residen-
tial subdivision on a scenic lake near historic Cooperstown since
187. 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1991).
188. Id. at 1034-35.
189. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0001-8-0117 (McKinney 2002).
190. Soc'y of Plastics, 573 N.E.2d at 1034-35.
191. Id. at 1041-43.
192. Id. at 1043.
193. Id.
194. Bennett v. Spear, 528 U.S. 167 (1997).
195. Soc'y of Plastics, 573 N.E.2d at 1046 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
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the group and its members did not actually use the property or
own land nearby. 197 More recently, in Save Our Main Street
Buildings v. Greene County Legislature,198 town residents did not
have standing to challenge the demolition of buildings in a historic
district "because their residences are not within sight of the Pro-
ject and as a result, any effects on scenic view would be no differ-
ent for them than for the public at large." 99
Some New York courts have, more logically, upheld standing
in SEQRA cases where the plaintiffs could satisfy the talisman of
injury different from that of the public at large. A plaintiff alleg-
ing contamination of his drinking water and a neighborhood group
claiming damage to a park its members used "much more fre-
quently than members of the general public" have succeeded in
surmounting the Society of Plastics hurdle.200
One can only hope New York's Court of Appeals will soon take
a belated second look at standing under SEQRA and limit Society
of Plastics to its facts. Alternatively, legislation to provide stand-
ing in SEQRA litigation could redress the problem.
V. Standing in Other Nations' Environmental Litigation
It is somewhat ironic that the highest courts of three develop-
ing countries far from our shores, all with legal systems based on
Anglo-American principles, have ruled that plaintiffs have stand-
ing in environmental litigation without having to negotiate the
barriers imposed by American courts. We have much to learn
from these recent decisions rendered by Asian courts.
The Philippines' highest court, in Oposa v. Factoran,20 1 up-
held the standing of minors and the Philippine Ecological Net-
work, Inc. to sue to cancel licenses to extract timber from that
197. Id. at 585.
198. 740 N.Y.S.2d 715 (App. Div. 2002), appeal denied, 775 N.E.2d 1288 (N.Y.
2002).
199. Id. at 718. See Joan Leary Matthews, Unlocking the Courthouse Doors: Re-
moval of the "Special Harm" Standing Requirement under SEQRA, 65 ALB. L. REV.
421 (2001); Philip Weinberg, Are Standing Requirements Becoming a Great Barrier
Reef Against Environmental Actions?, 7 N.Y.U. ENV'rL. L.J. 1 (1999).
200. Comm. to Preserve Brighton Beach & Manhattan Beach, Inc. v. Planning
Comm'n, 695 N.Y.S.2d 7, 11 (App. Div. 1999). See also Long Island Pine Barrens
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country's pristine rainforest. 20 2 The action was based on a consti-
tutional provision that "[t]he State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology."20 3 The
court ruled the minor plaintiffs could sue on their own behalf as
well as for future generations, since "the minors' assertion of their
right to sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the per-
formance of [the defendants'] obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come .... ,,204
Pakistan's Supreme Court likewise held in Zia v. WAPDA
(Water and Power Development Authority)20 5 that citizens had
standing to sue to enjoin construction of a power transmission grid
without alleging special or individual injury, because of asserted
health concerns from electromagnetic fields. 20 6 This suit was
based on that nation's due process clause, which reads similarly to
our own.20 7 The court held that:
[W]here life of citizens is degraded, the quality of life is ad-
versely affected and health hazards are created affecting a large
number of people the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 184(3) of the Constitution may grant relief to the extent
of stopping the functioning of units which create pollution and
environmental degradation. 208
That article empowers the Pakistani Supreme Court to issue or-
ders to enforce the fundamental rights, including due process
rights, enumerated earlier in the constitution. 20 9
Similarly, the High Court Division of Bangladesh ruled in
Farooque v. Bangladesh210 that the Bangladesh Environmental
Lawyers' Association could challenge the lack of environmental
impact assessments for several development projects. 211 The
202. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1 CAPACITY BUILDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN
THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION: APPROACHES & RESOURCES 720-21 (Donna G. Craig,
Koh Kheng-Lian, & Nicholas A. Robinson eds., 2003) [hereinafter CAPACITY
BUILDING].
203. PHILIPPINES CONST. art. II, § 16 (1987).
204. CAPACITY BUILDING, supra note 202, at 728.
205. PLD, 1994, Sup. Ct. 693 (1994), reported in MATTERS RELATED TO ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 201, at 323-34.
206. CAPACITY BUILDING, supra note 202, at 730.
207. PAK. CONST. art. 9 (1973).
208. CAPACITY BUILDING, supra note 202, at 730.
209. PAK. CONST. art. 184(3) (1973).
210. Civil Appeal no. 24 of 1995, 17 BLD (AD) 1997, Vol. XVII, pp. 1-33; 1 BLC
(AD) (1996), pp. 186-219, reported in MATTERS RELATED TO ENVIRONMENT, supra note
201, at 37-45.
211. CAPACITY BUILDING, supra note 202, at 739.
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court specifically noted that "[ilf a fundamental right is involved,
the impugned matter need not affect a purely personal right of the
applicant touching him alone. It is enough if he shares that right
in common with others."2 12
Conclusion
Our courts have abused the historic rules of standing and
thrust needless obstacles before environmental litigants. Al-
though the Laidlaw decision has for now halted the Supreme
Court's assault on standing, the threat of further rulings like
those that preceded it remains. And the New York experience
shows that even without the federal courts' debatable reliance on
Article III, courts are quite capable of unduly restricting standing
in environmental cases.
This issue is not just one of procedural niceties or judicial
economy. Limiting standing in environmental litigation gives
government agencies and industry carte blanche to violate laws
enacted to safeguard public health and protect natural resources.
For all the pieties mouthed about the need to ensure the separa-
tion of powers-see the language of Justice Scalia in Defenders of
Wildlife213-the true separation of powers concern is the need for
the courts, as always, to curb abuses by the other two branches, a
need voiced as early as Marbury v. Madison214 and many times
since. It is still, as was true two centuries ago, "emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."215 This can only happen if litigants are free, within reasona-
ble and historic limits, to enter the courthouse.
212. Id. at 736.
213. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
214. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
215. Id. at 177. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (quoting
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
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